CITP: “Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine”
With election day two months away, it’s alarming to know that Diebold’s electronic voting machines are so vulnerable to attack. This post shows how, with less than a minute alone with a voting machin–such as any poll worker could engineer–an individual could easily sabotage an election by stealing votes from one candidate and giving them to another.
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[...] Since 2000, many states have used touch-screen voting machines, mostly produced by Diebold, that produce no paper trail of the votes. In other words, the voter has no guarantee that the vote on the screen is the vote recorded. And there is some pretty solid evidence that many votes are not recorded and that others are fabricated out of thin air. In an Ohio county, districts with a few hundred people were recording thousands of votes for one candidate. In Florida, numerous counties reported more votes for president than there were voters. This takes either extremely shoddy code or intentional tampering. [...]